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Understanding the determinants of home-efficiency improvements is
significant to a range of energy policy issues, including the reduction of fossil
fuel use and environmental protection.This paper analyzes retrofit choices by
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Germany with regional data on wages and construction costs. To explore the
influence of both heterogeneous preferences and correlation among the util-
ity of alternatives, conditional-, random parameters-, and error components
logit models are estimated that parameterize the influence of costs, energy
savings,andhousehold-levelsocioeconomicattributesonthelikelihoodofun-
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assess the extent to which free-ridership may undermine the effectiveness of
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Home renovation is generally asserted to be a highly eﬀective means for house-
holds to lower expenditures on energy through increased eﬃciency. From a public
policy perspective, energy eﬃciency in the residential sector confers the additional
beneﬁt of reducing reliance on fossil fuels, thereby contributing to both energy
security and environmental stewardship. In Germany, as in other industrialized
countries, the residential sector accounts for upwards of 30% of energy end use,
the overwhelming share of which is consumed for space heating and hot water
preparation. Consequently, the improvement of home insulation and heating
equipment in the existing building stock, which directly impacts the energy re-
quired for heating services, is seen to aﬀord considerable scope for reducing the
country’s energy consumption.
Over the past decade, the German government has implemented several ﬁnan-
cial support programs to encourage such retroﬁtting activities. Homeowners have
received access to low-interest loans and – in a recently launched program initiated
in 2007 – can alternatively apply for grants. An important question in gauging
the policy merits of such measures concerns the homeowner’s willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for the energy savings that accrue through renovations. Given this infor-
mation, one can analyze whether and to what extent the subsidization program
suﬀers from free rider eﬀects. Free ridership occurs if the subsidized household
would have undertaken the energy-conserving activity even in the absence of the
subsidy, that is, if the household’s WTP exceeds cost (Train 1994). Despite its
relevance to the assessment of publicly-ﬁnanced programs, WTP estimates for
energy-savings and the associated implications for free-ridership have received
scant scrutiny to date.
The purpose of the present study is twofold. First, we estimate the determi-
nants of home retroﬁts and derive therefrom estimates of the marginal WTP for
energy savings. Second, we assess the extent to which free rider eﬀects threaten
4to undermine the social beneﬁts of the subsidization program. These objectives
are pursued using a unique data set of some 2530 owners of German single-family
homes, which combines real investment cost for 16 retroﬁt measures, engineering
estimates of the respective energy savings, and information on wage and material
costs along with the sociodemographic characteristics of the sampled households.
Our work builds on a handful of earlier studies of household energy consump-
tion behavior, most of which draw on data obtained from surveys in the U.S.
With respect to home retroﬁts, Cameron (1985) was among the ﬁrst to analyze
household choice behavior using a nested logit model. She ﬁnds that income,
relative energy prices, and retroﬁt prices are the key determinants of demand
for conservation retroﬁts. Subsequent studies using U.S. household survey data
have extended this line of inquiry in a number of directions, including analyses
that address the eﬀectiveness of energy conservation programs (Hartman 1988),
the eﬀects of changes in energy prices on the consumption of housing, residen-
tial energy, and other goods (Quigley and Rubinfeld 1989), and the extent to
which homeowners apply high discount rates to home-improvement opportuni-
ties (Metcalf and Hassett 1999). Among the few studies of this issue from the
European context, Banﬁ et al. (2008) estimate household’s marginal willingness-
to-pay using an innovative stated choice experiment conducted among a sample
of Swiss apartment tenants and homeowners. Their estimates, obtained from a
multinominal logit model, suggest the importance of both energy savings as well
as comfort beneﬁts as determinants of retroﬁt choices.
Although publicly ﬁnanced programs to encourage energy conservation are
increasingly common in industrialized countries, only a few studies have inves-
tigated the magnitude of free rider eﬀects. Joskow and Marron (1992) and Eto
et al. (1995) conduct a meta-analysis of free ridership by surveying evaluations
of demand-side management (DSM) programs conducted by U.S. utilities. With
respect to residential programs, the authors uncover a wide range of estimates,
varying from zero to up to 50% of free riders. However, most of the reviewed eval-
5uations are based on simple survey questions that ask the respondents whether
they would have hypothetically reached the same decision in absence of the DSM
program. Due to the nature of these questions, the calculated free rider share
may therefore be susceptible to a hypothetical- or response bias.1 Malm (1996)
circumvents these diﬃculties by analyzing the revealed choice of high eﬃciency
heating system purchases among diﬀerent clusters of consumers. He derives an
impressive share of 89% of households that would have bought the eﬃcient equip-
ment even in the absence of a subsidy.
The present paper illustrates an alternative approach for quantifying free-
riding by combining revealed preference data with cost estimates derived from
engineering calculations. Our method is similar to Cameron’s (1985) in that nests
are imposed to capture correlation of the utility across alternatives, but, rather
than using the nested logit model, we employ an analog thereof that involves
the speciﬁcation of an error-components structure (Brownstone and Train 1999).
We additionally allow for heterogeneous preferences by specifying household spe-
ciﬁc random parameters, closely following Revelt and Train’s (1998) analysis of
the willingness-to-pay for lower operating costs of household appliances. Our
investigation uncovers a potential free-rider share of up to 50% of the sampled
households, substantially lower than Malm’s (1996) estimates but still suﬃciently
high to warrant scrutiny of ﬁnancial support for renovations.
The paper is outlined as follows. After a brief description of the data, Section
2 discusses the challenges of accommodating unobserved heterogenity in a discrete
choice framework and describes alternative models derived from random utility
theory for addressing them. Section 3 catalogues the empirical results and uses
these to derive household-speciﬁc estimates of marginal willingness-to-pay. These
results are used to draw policy implications with respect to free-rider problems
in the context of Germany’s current grants scheme. Section 4 concludes.
1To the extent that program participants feel committed to justify the existence of the DSM
program the bias would yield an underestimation of the true free-rider share.
62 Methodology
Our data are drawn from a sample of 2530 single-family home owners, surveyed
in 2005 as part of the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey. Four
diﬀerent retroﬁt measures (and their combinations) are surveyed: roof insula-
tion, fa¸ cade insulation, windows replacement, and heating-equipment replace-
ment. These measures, along with the option not to undertake a retroﬁt, yield
a total of 16 diﬀerent combinations from which the household chooses. In total,
64% of the households retroﬁtted their homes between 1995 and 2004.
While the decision concerning renovation is essentially driven by two deter-
minants, investment cost and the savings from reduced energy usage, the house-
hold’s choice is diﬃcult to anticipate because of several uncertainties. First,
varying expectations of future energy prices will result in varying expectations
of the proﬁtability of renovation options. Further, a household may face infor-
mation deﬁcits as well as high costs of information acquisition about existing
retroﬁtting alternatives. Even when the alternatives are known, the calculation
of energy savings is likely to be beyond the capabilities of the layperson. Finally,
there might exist other hidden costs and beneﬁts that determine the household’s
decision process. Examples of costs include the noise and dirt that accompany
some retroﬁt measures, while beneﬁts may include higher social standing from
spill-over eﬀects within a neighborhood (Ioannides 2002). As a consequence of
these considerations, there might exist preference heterogeneity concerning the
attributes of a retroﬁt, leading in turn to heteroegeneity with respect to the
household’s expected net beneﬁts and hence WTP for energy-saving measures.
We accommodate such heterogeneity by employing econometric models that af-
ford broad coverage of the determinants – both observable and unobservable – of
the individual household’s utility from alternative retroﬁtting options.
72.1 Discrete Choice Models
Random utility theory provides a suitable framework for our analysis, as it pre-
dicts choices by comparing the utility associated with distinct retroﬁtting alter-
natives. Each household faces a choice set C with K elements. The utility Uij
of household i for alternative j ∈Ccomprises a deterministic and a stochastic
component:
(1) Uij = Vij +  ij,
with Vij = αj + Xijβ as representative utility, determined by the alternative
speciﬁc constant αj and the matrix Xij, which captures alternative-speciﬁc at-
tributes (e.g. costs) as well as characteristics of the household (e.g. income). The
portion of utility that is unobservable to the researcher is represented by  ij.
Household i chooses alternative j if and only if Uij >U ik for all k  = j, with
j,k ∈C . The probability Pi(j) of selecting j from the set of alternatives is thus
dependent on  ij and is equal to:
Pi(j)=Pr(Vij +  ij >V ik +  ik)
= Pr( ik −  ij <V ij − Vik),∀k  = j.
(2)
Assuming the error terms to be identically and independently (iid) distributed
as Gumbel (or Type I extreme value), the resulting probability model is logistic,
giving rise to the well-known conditional logit model (see e.g. Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 1985), with choice probabilities equal to:
(3) Pi(j)=
eVij
 
k
e
Vik
.
One drawback of this model is its imposition of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption, requiring that when one alternative is removed
from the choice set C, the choice probabilities of the remaining alternatives rise
by the same proportion. This assumption is, in particular, violated when the error
8terms are not independent, as is the case when there are subsets of alternatives for
which unobserved shocks have concomitant eﬀects. For example, those renovation
alternatives involving roof and fa¸ cade insulation may be associated with high
levels of noise and dirt, thereby having a common adverse eﬀect on utility. On
the other hand, these same alternatives and possibly others may positively aﬀect
utility by contributing to social standing. Hence, each retroﬁt option may belong
to several sets of alternatives that have a common eﬀect on utility. Following
Brownstone and Train (1998), one can account for such groupings of similar sets
of alternatives – and thereby relax the IIA assumption – by imposing a particular
correlation structure on the utility of the alternatives via the addition of an error
component:
(4) Uij = Vij + ψµj +  ij = Vij + ηij,
where ψ is a normally distributed random parameter with zero mean, and µj
is a dummy variable which equals one if a certain latent eﬀect is present in the
utility of alternative j. Hence, the random quantity ψ only enters the utility of
alternatives that share this eﬀect.2 Although the iid assumption for the  ’s still
holds, the utility of the respective alternatives are correlated via the unobserved
portion of utility η :
(5) E(ηij,η ik)=E(ψµj +  ij,ψµ k +  ik)=E(ψ,ψ)=σ
2
ψ,j  = k.
Incorporating this latent eﬀect into Equation (3) yields the error-component logit
model:
(6) Pi(j)=
eVij+ψµj
 
k
e
Vik+ψµk
,
2For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our attention here only to the case where one such
eﬀect is present, although much more complex correlation structures can be imposed with
additional error components.
9exhibiting a covariance matrix Σ = µ µ µσ2
ψµ µ µ  +σ2
 I I I, with µ µ µ as K ×1 vector of zeros
and ones that create the correlation structure.
Another drawback of the conditional logit model (3) is that it does not allow
for taste variation, meaning that any household speciﬁc deviation from the mean-
sample taste would enter into the unobserved part of utility  ij. In the present
application, this would preclude the possibility that households exhibit diﬀerent
responses to the determinants of retroﬁtting alternatives. An appropriate method
to deal with such heterogeneity in adoption behavior is to allow for household
speciﬁc coeﬃcients βi =(¯ β + ui), with ui as a household speciﬁc deviation from
the sample mean ¯ β, such that β exhibits a distribution across the sample of
households. This gives rise to the random-parameter logit model:
(7) Pi(j)=
 
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
eVij(βi)
 
k
e
Vik(βi)
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠f(β)dβ.
Equation (7) is a generalization of Equation (3) as it estimates not only the mean
coeﬃcient but the parameters of the underlying distribution for those coeﬃcients
that are speciﬁed as random (Train 2003). For example, if a random parameter
β is assumed be normally distributed in the population, the random-parameter
logit model estimates the mean and standard deviation of β. The coeﬃcients can
thus vary across observations, thereby accounting for taste variations with respect
to the attributes of the available retroﬁtting alternatives. In this way, some parts
of the unobserved heterogeneity inherent in the conditional logit model can be
removed (Hensher and Greene 2003).
The random-parameter logit fully relaxes the IIA property and additionally
allows for any correlation structure between the utility of diﬀerent alternatives.
If the representation of a particular correlation pattern is deemed important,
the random-parameter logit can also be speciﬁed using the error components de-
scribed above. As discussed by Koppelman and Bhat (2006), this more ﬂexible
approach captures both heterogeneous preferences and complex correlation pat-
10terns by layering the error components on top of the random-parameter logit
model.
2.2 Speciﬁcation of Utility
Recognizing the preceding discussion about heterogeneous adoption behavior, we
assume that the household’s utility Vij is negatively eﬀected by the investment
cost Cij, and positively eﬀected by the decline of the building’s annual primary
energy demand ∆Qij, measured in megawatt hours (MWh), both of which are
associated with a speciﬁc retroﬁtting alternative j. We control for the economic
background of the households by including annual disposable income into the
analysis.3 Further, we expect that the level of the household’s energy consump-
tion inﬂuences the decision of whether to renovate, either positively because a
household with a high energy consumption level is more inclined to lower its
energy cost, or negatively because a high level reﬂects low energy awareness.
Moreover, because there is a quality diﬀerential between the building stocks in
western and eastern Germany, a binary variable indicates whether the household
lives in the eastern part of Germany. Finally, we include a measure of the ac-
cessibility of information on home retroﬁts within the immediate vicinity of the
household. This variable is intended to proxy for the transaction costs of infor-
mation acquisition, and is deﬁned as the relative availability of certiﬁed home
auditors within a 20 kilometer radius of the household’s location.4
3As is typical for survey data, information on income is missing for a large share of the
households - roughly 20%. To impute these missing values, we employ the expectation-
maximization algorithm recommended by King et al. (2001). The employed algorithm can
be implemented using a program compatible with the statistical software R, and is download-
able from http://gking.harvard.edu.
4To derive this measure we drew upon a list of certiﬁed home auditors and their addresses
published by the German government. We read the data as a map-layer into a Geographical
Information System and overlaid this with a layer of household locations. We then created a
circular buﬀer around each household having a radius of 20 kilometers and generated a count
11We choose the conditional logit model as empirical point of departure, and ex-
plore the implications of re-estimating the model using three alternative discrete
choice models: the conditional logit model with error components, the random
parameters logit model, and error components layered over the random parame-
ters logit model, our most ﬂexible model. The speciﬁcation of utility in the most
general form is:
Uij = αj +(¯ β1 + ui1)Cij +(¯ β2 + ui2)∆Qij
+
 
l∈z z z
βlCijzil +
 
m∈z z z
βm∆Qijzim
+
 
h∈{1,2}
ψhµjh +  ij,
(8)
where α is a constant that is speciﬁc to alternative j, Cij is the investment
cost of household i for alternative j, and ∆Qij is the respective energy-savings
variable, computed as the diﬀerence in the building’s annual primary energy
demand in response to retroﬁt j.5 The vector z z zi· = {income, energy consumption,
information access, east} contains the household-speciﬁc characteristics that enter
utility via interaction eﬀects with investment cost and energy savings. Details
on data assembly for cost and energy savings are given in the appendix. Table
1 presents an overview of the data, including a listing of the 16 options and
the corresponding average costs and energy savings. The random parameters
βi1 =( ¯ β1 + ui1) for investment cost and βi2 =( ¯ β2 + ui2) for energy savings,
as well as the error components ψh ∼ N(0,σ2
ψh),h ∈{ 1,2}, are only present
in the random-parameters and error components logit models, respectively. For
of auditors within this buﬀer. As a ﬁnal step, we divided this count by the number of homes
(excluding apartment complexes) within the buﬀer. The variable thus created serves to capture
the relative availability of expert guidance on retroﬁts within the vicinity of the household.
5It is important to emphasize that because such savings accumulate over the lifetime of
the retroﬁt, the value of ∆Qij is not equivalent to the energy spot price of a MWh, but rather
will depend on several household-speciﬁc attributes, including time preference and expectations
about future energy prices.
12Table 1: Mean Investment Cost and Mean Energy Savings
Number of Cost ∆Q Error Comp.
households chosen in 1000 e in MWh 1 2
No renovation 904 
Roof 82 11.9 6.7 
Window 116 6.3 2.8
Fa¸ cade 26 10.5 7.2 
Heating 313 2.3 3.3
Roof, Window 102 18.1 9.5 
Roof, Fa¸ cade 17 20.1 13.9 
Roof, Heating 90 14.2 9.3 
Window, Fa¸ cade 31 16.7 10.1 
Window, Heating 244 8.5 5.8
Fa¸ cade, Heating 23 12.7 9.8 
Roof, Window, Fa¸ cade 56 26.3 16.8 
Roof, Window, Heating 226 20.4 11.8 
Roof, Fa¸ cade, Heating 22 22.3 15.7 
Window, Fa¸ cade, Heating 70 19.0 12.3 
Roof, Window, Fa¸ cade, Heating 208 28.6 18.3 
example, if ui1 = ui2 = 0 for all households i, and σ2
ψ1 = σ2
ψ2 = 0, then Equation
(8) collapses to the conditional logit speciﬁcation.
In specifying the error components ψh, the aim was to capture latent eﬀects
speciﬁc to an outcome or a set of outcomes. We explored several alternatives,
guided by the considerations noted above concerning both the hidden costs and
beneﬁts of, respectively, grime and prestige associated with particular retroﬁt
options. The presented speciﬁcation follows closely Cameron’s (1985) nested logit
analysis by incorporating two error components, the ﬁrst of which distinguishes
the binary decision concerning whether to retroﬁt, and the second of which groups
13 of the remaining retroﬁt combinations that tend to produce annoying levels
of dirt and disarray (indicated in the ﬁnal column of Table 1). We also explored
models with additional error components for alternatives conferring prestige, but
13found these to yield no signiﬁcant improvements to the model ﬁt.6
In the random parameters logit model, we allow for taste heterogeneity – even
after controlling for the eﬀects of the interaction variables contained in z z z –b y
treating the coeﬃcients of cost and ∆Q as random. Alternative distributions
can be availed for capturing heterogeneity, the most common of which are the
normal and log-normal. The latter, being bounded on the left by zero, is par-
ticularly useful when theory suggests that the coeﬃcient has the same sign for
every decision-maker, as is the case here for the expected negative and positive
coeﬃcients of cost and ∆Q. The drawback of the lognormal – shared with the
normal – is that its long tail can produce unreasonably large coeﬃcients for some
share of the observations. We consequently follow Revelt and Train (2000) and
Hensher and Greene (2003) in specifying β1 and β2 as triangular distributed.
The triangular distribution has the form of a tent, peaking in the center at the
mean and dropping oﬀ linearly on both sides of the center to form a density. It
is possible to restrict the triangular distribution to yield coeﬃcients of the same
sign for all observations, but this restriction was found to be unnecessary with
the present data.
As conditional and error component logit both have closed form solutions,
they can be estimated using maximum likelihood. The random parameters logit,
by contrast, requires that the integral in equation (7) be approximated by means
of simulation using random draws from the mixing distribution (Train 2003). To
this end, we employ a Halton sequence to draw realizations from the population
triangular distribution. We tested the sensitivity of the parameter estimates with
diﬀerent numbers of Halton draws per observation and found the results to be
stable with as few as 100 draws.
6As noted by Hensher, Jones, and Greene (2007), speciﬁc alternatives can appear with
diﬀerent subsets of alternatives, making it possible to build overlapping error components that,
in the present case, include both grimy and prestigious alternatives.
14Table 2: Estimation Results of Logit Models
CLogit RP. Logit
×10−2 CLogit RP. Logit with EC. with EC.
Cost (Cij) −12.667∗∗ −12.873∗∗ −18.469∗∗ −18.410∗∗
Energy Savings (∆Qij)2 2 .700∗∗ 23.296∗∗ 32.806∗∗ 32.843∗∗
Interaction of Cost with
Energy Consumption 0.101∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.157∗∗
Income −0.124∗ −0.129∗ −0.177∗∗ −0.182∗∗
Information Access 0.116 0.121 0.157∗ 0.157∗
East 4.783∗∗ 4.946∗∗ 7.723∗∗ 7.724∗∗
Interaction of Energy Savings with
Energy Consumption −0.162∗∗ −0.167∗∗ −0.239∗∗ −0.241∗∗
Income 0.100 0.105 0.152∗ 0.158∗
Information Access −0.020 −0.022 −0.020 −0.020
East −0.980 −1.073 −2.817 −2.770
Standard deviation for random parameters distribution
Cost 4.732 0.110
Energy Savings 1.289 0.318
Standard deviation for error components
No renovation 0.365 0.501
Annoying renovation 210.741∗∗ 211.819∗∗
Log-Likelihood -5054 -5054 -5035 -5034
∗∗signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ∗signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Alternative speciﬁc constants not presented.
3 Results
In this section we present the results of the discrete choice models. The section
begins with a cataloging of the coeﬃcient estimates followed by a comparison of
model ﬁt. Thereafter we derive the marginal WTP and present its distribution
over households. The section closes with a discussion of free-ridership and policy
implications.
3.1 Coeﬃcient Estimates and Model Fit
Table 2 presents the results of a conditional-, random parameters-, error com-
ponents, and error components with random parameters logit model. All four
models tell a consistent story. The signs of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are the
15same across models and are of similar magnitude, depending on whether error
components are present. The key eﬀects pertaining to investment cost and energy
savings have the expected positive and negative eﬀect on utility, respectively, and
are highly signiﬁcant. Because the standard deviations for the parameter distribu-
tions of these two coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant (i.e. ui1 = ui2 =0∀i),
there is no empirical evidence for taste heterogeneity beyond the variation that
is captured by the interaction eﬀects.
The results of these interaction terms must be interpreted with respect to
the coeﬃcients of Cij and ∆Qij. For example, increasing energy consumption
is seen to attenuate both the negative eﬀect of cost and the positive eﬀect of
energy savings, which is consistent with the intuition that high energy-consuming
households are less responsive to changes in energy expenditures. Likewise, the
error components variants of the model indicate that access to information, as
measured by the relative availability of certiﬁed auditors within a 20 kilometer
radius of the household, has a dampening eﬀect on the negative inﬂuence of
cost that is of roughly the same magnitude as energy consumption. Income,
on the other hand, exacerbates the negative inﬂuence of costs. An explanation
for this ﬁnding is not immediately forthcoming, other than to speculate that
wealthier households may be more aware of other, more proﬁtable investment
opportunities than housing. Finally, households living in the eastern part of
Germany experience less disutility from the investment cost than their western
counterparts. This result is expected, since the East-German building sector
was in dire need of rehabilitation before reuniﬁcation. This led in the 1990s
to an extensive wave of refurbishment on the territory of the former German
Democratic Republic.
Regarding the question of model ﬁt, a comparison of the log-likelihoods sug-
gests that little is gained from the incorporation of heterogeneous preferences
using the random parameters logit, an unsurprising ﬁnding given the insigniﬁ-
16cance of the parameter distributions.7 By contrast, the partitioning of the choice
set using the error components appears to be an essential model speciﬁcation.
Not only is the standard deviation on “annoying” alternatives highly signiﬁcant,
indicating that the utilities of the respective retroﬁt alternatives are correlated,
but there is also clear-cut evidence of a signiﬁcant improvement in the ﬁt of the
model compared to the models that omit the error components.8 We thus con-
clude that the error components logit model is the superior choice for these data,
and we proceed by calculating the respondent’s marginal willingness-to-pay for
energy savings using the coeﬃcient estimates from this model.
3.2 Marginal willingness-to-pay and its Distribution
The household’s WTP for decreasing the building’s primary energy demand by
one kWh can be derived as the marginal rate of substitution between investment
cost and energy savings. For the calculation of the respondent’s marginal WTP
(MWTP), we thus ﬁx the representative utility Vij and take the total derivative
of Equation (8):
dVij = dCij(β1 +
 
l
βlzil)+d∆Qij(β2 +
 
m
βmzim)=0 ,
MWTP i =
dCij
d∆Qij
= −
(β1 +
 
l βlzim)
(β2 +
 
m βmzil)
.
(9)
Hence, individual MWTP can be expressed as the ratio of the cost and energy-
saving coeﬃcients, including their interaction eﬀects.
7A likelihood ratio (LR) test of the conditional logit model without error components against
the random parameter logit without error components and two degrees of freedom yields a LR
statistic of 0 (p=0.5). The corresponding LR statistic from the models with error components
is 2 (p=0.184).
8A likelihood ratio (LR) test of the conditional logit model without random parameters
against the error components logit without random parameters and two degrees of freedom
yields a LR statistic of 38 (p less than 0.0001). The corresponding LR statistic from the models
with random parameters is 40 (p less than 0.001).
17Figure 1: Marginal WTP Estimates
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of households’ MWTP per kWh change in
the building’s primary energy demand. An interesting insight into the valuation
of energy savings in Germany can be gleaned from the lower panel of Figure 1,
which shows the distributions of MWTP estimates according to whether house-
holds live in the eastern or western part of the country. Eastern households are
seen to reveal a much higher MWTP and a larger variability in their estimates,
determining almost the entire right tail of the distribution in the upper panel.
Table 3 reports summary statistics of MWTP estimates obtained from the error
components logit model. Eastern households exhibit a mean MWTP of e3.28 per
kWh, while the mean western MWTP is considerably less at e1.72.9 The much
lower standard deviation indicates that the evaluation of energy savings among
western households is fairly homogenous. Given that the immense discrepancy in
9Using a Mann-Whitney test we checked whether the east and the west MWTP stems from
the same population. We reject this hypotheses at a signiﬁcance level of p<0.0001.
18Table 3: Marginal WTP in East- and West-Germany
Observations Mean Std.Dev. Median
East 402 3.28 1.76 2.99
West 2128 1.72 0.65 1.69
Total 2530 1.97 1.08 1.73
MWTP is depicted in e/kWh, measured in prices of 2000.
MWTP within Germany is essentially a result of the special situation of Eastern
Germany’s building stock, we consider the estimates obtained for western house-
holds to better reﬂect the prevailing MWTP in the post-uniﬁcation period.
3.3 Policy Implications
The most recent ﬁnancial support program of the German government to en-
courage retroﬁts allows households to not only apply for loans, but also provides
grants for covering renovation expenses. Up to 10% of the investment cost are
awarded, reaching a maximum of e5000 per dwelling. With individual MWTP
estimates for energy savings and the associated investment cost in hand, we can
approximate the share of households that would undertake the retroﬁt irrespec-
tively of the ﬁnancial support. Given that these households cannot be identiﬁed
by the program authority in advance, they have an incentive to free ride on the
grant.
An immediate challenge in gauging the extent of free-ridership returns us to
the issue of how to account for hidden costs. We deﬁne a free-rider as a household
whose individual WTP, calculated as the product of MWTP i × ∆Qij, is greater
than the sum of the observed plus hidden costs incurred from a particular retroﬁt:
WTPij > observed costsij + hidden costsij       
total costij
.
Although our WTP estimates account for hidden costs via the inclusion of both
latent eﬀects and information cost, drawing deﬁnitive conclusions from the above
19equation is obviously complicated by the fact that we still cannot be sure what
share of the total costs is accounted for by hidden costs. If this share is large but
ignored in the calculation of total costs, our estimate of free-ridership would be
inﬂated. Although we are unable to assign a monetary value to the hidden costs,
we can rearrange the equation as (subscripts omitted):
(10) WTP − observed costs > hidden costs.
Starting with the special case of zero hidden cost, we designate the household
as a free-rider if the inequality in Equation (10) holds. If we subsequently allow
for increasingly higher hidden costs, a point will eventually be reached at which
the inequality in Equation (10) becomes an equality. From this point on, the
household would no longer be a free-rider, as its hidden costs are large enough
such that the total cost exceed its WTP.
With these mechanics in hand, we can explore the sensitivity of the estimated
free-rider share to diﬀerent hypothetical levels of hidden costs for all alternatives.
Note that because the WTP estimates of households from eastern Germany are
likely to be inﬂated due to the urgency of renovation following reuniﬁcation, we
consider in the following only the 2128 households located in western Germany.
We further restrict our attention to the western households that have a WTP
that exceed the observed cost, since this this is a necessary condition for potential
free-ridership.10 Depending on the respective retroﬁt option, roughly 50% of the
western households have a WTP ≥ observed cost, validating a similar result that
was observed by Banﬁ et al. (2008).
The abscissas of Figure 2 shows the hidden cost as a percent of the observed
cost for two commonly chosen retroﬁt combinations. To facilitate interpretation,
the hidden cost is expressed as a share of the observed cost, which for simpliﬁca-
tion of the exposition is assumed to be equal across households. For each level of
10The remaining western households exhibit a WTP < observed cost, and hence can be
excluded as free-riders at the outset.
20Figure 2: Share of Free-Rider for Selected Retroﬁt Options
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this share, the histogram depicts the count of households for which the inequal-
ity sign in Equation (10) inﬂects, and the dashed line traces the corresponding
fraction of households that are designated as free-riders over diﬀerent shares of
hidden cost.
Figure 3(a) displays the roof-window-heating option, for which 1054 of the
2128 western households have a WTP ≥ observed cost. Starting again with
the special case of zero hidden cost, the histogram indicates zero observations,
implying that in the absence of hidden cost all 1054 households can be treated as
free-riders. Correspondingly, the dashed line, which references the right ordinate,
indicates a fraction of just under 50% free-riders for this level of hidden cost.
Moving to the right along the abscissa and increasing the hypothetical share
of hidden cost increases the number of households for which the inequality in
Equation (10) inﬂects, meaning that these households can no longer be classiﬁed
as free-riders. For example, the most left bar of the histogram suggests that
there are some 20 households for which their total cost exceed their WTP for
a share of hidden cost between 0% and 5% of observed cost. Excluding these
20 households from the set of free-riders, the dashed line drops only slightly
21to 49% free-rider fraction. Moving further along the abscissa yields a further
exclusion of households that are marked by the histogram. At its peak, which
corresponds to a share of 50% hidden cost, the estimated fraction of free-riders
is still non-negligible, reaching roughly 20% of the sample of western households.
This fraction approaches zero only when the hidden cost comprises up to 100%
of observed cost.
A similar pattern for a diﬀerent retroﬁt alternative is seen in Figure 3(b),
which shows the roof-window-facade-heating option. Even when hidden costs
comprise the sizeable share of 50% of observed costs, the corresponding share of
free-riders is substantial at roughly 38%.
We thus conclude that our results call into question the logic of providing
renovation grants to households. Nearly half of the households show a WTP
larger than the required observed investment cost, a result that is reduced only
marginally when hidden costs are taken into account. As such households cannot
be identiﬁed in advance, the awarded grants are likely to be exposed to extensive
free riding.
4 Conclusions
This paper has estimated willingness-to-pay for energy savings that accompany
a building’s retroﬁt. Using revealed choice data from a survey among German
homeowners, we rely on the random-utility framework to capture individual and
choice alternative attributes that determine the decision process. Starting with
the standard conditional logit model, we augment the model’s ﬂexibility by ﬁrst
allowing for preference heterogeneity using the random parameters logit model,
and second imposing a structure to capture correlation among the utility of the
alternatives with the error components logit model. We ﬁnd that the conditional
and the random parameters logit model yield almost identical results, while the
error components logit model gives the best ﬁt to the data at hand. Thus, we
22conclude that the augmented ﬂexibility of the random parameters logit model
does not justify its higher computational costs with these data.
We completed the analysis by using the obtained marginal willingness-to-pay
estimates and investment cost to generate insights into the extent to which free-
rider eﬀects may undermine the social beneﬁts of a ﬁnancial support program.
We found that for some 50% of the households, the willingness-to-pay exceeds the
observed cost, a share that drops only slightly when allowing for the possibility
that households incur additional hidden costs.
Our ﬁndings are of special interest in Europe, given that a recent directive of
the European Union requires that member states introduce political measures to
decrease energy end-use by 9%. To the extent that measures such as Germany’s
grants program suﬀer from extensive free-riding – and our results suggest that
they do – an immediate issue arises as to whether these political targets should
recognize free-rider eﬀects, and make corresponding adjustments. The analysis
presented in this paper provides the ﬁrst step in articulating such an adjustment
by quantifying the magnitude of the problem. Having done so, two useful endeav-
ors for future research emerge. The ﬁrst would involve devising methodological
approaches for quantifying the level of hidden costs associated with renovation
activities, perhaps by drawing on experimental techniques. The second extension
would estimate the determinants of free-riding, with the ultimate aim of identi-
fying options for excluding free-riders from program participation by means such
as market discrimination.
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Appendix: Data assembly
Our data is drawn from a sample of 2530 single-family home owners, surveyed
in 2005 as part of the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey. The
data contain a location identiﬁer for each household, which is measured at the
municipal level. The data additionally contain socioeconomic and dwelling char-
acteristics, including whether the household received an energy audit and which
retroﬁt measure was implemented within the last 10 years, if any. Four diﬀerent
retroﬁt measures (and their combinations) are surveyed: roof insulation, fa¸ cade
insulation, windows replacement, and heating-equipment replacement.
4.1 Energy Savings
The computation of energy savings are based on engineering relationships and are
measured as the decline of the building’s annual primary energy demand following
a retroﬁt. We ﬁrst reconstruct the size of the building shell using computer
aided design. This reconstruction, which combines information on the area of
living space, the number of stories, and simplifying assumptions concerning the
building form, allows us to derive the extent of the heat-transmitting surface
and the required heating power. Following the relationships provided by the
respective technical standards set by the German Institute for Standardization,
the demand for primary energy can be expressed as:
(11) Q =( QH (HT)+QW) ∗ ep,
where Q is the building’s primary energy demand, QH is the demand for space
heating, and QW is the energy demand for hot water, all under standardized
26conditions. The term ep ≥ 1 is the eﬃciency factor of the heating equipment and
converts ﬁnal energy demand (such as energy for space heating) into primary
energy demand. QH is determined by dwelling size and the insulation quality
of the building’s envelope. The better the insulation, the less heat is lossed due
to transmission through the building’s envelope. The total heat loss HT of a
building, measured in Watts per year, is computed as:
(12) HT =
 
r
(Ur +0 .05) ∗ Ar,
with Ar describing the surface in m2 of a certain component r of the building’s
envelope. The so-called ”U-Value” expresses the heat loss of the component in
watts per m2, given a diﬀerence of 1 Kelvin between indoor and outdoor temper-
ature.11 The smaller the U-Value, the better the insulation, and the smaller the
heat loss and the energy demand for space heating.
Roof and fa¸ cade insulation as well as window replacement alter HT by lowering
the U-Value of a speciﬁc component, and hence reduce QH and Q. An eﬃciency
improvement of the heating equipment lowers ep. Thus, energy savings ∆Q are
computed as the diﬀerence in the building’s annual primary energy demand in
response to changes in HT and ep:
(13) ∆Q =
∂Q
∂QH
∂QH
∂HT
dHT +
∂Q
∂ep
dep.
Because we lack data on exact U-values and eﬃciency factors ep of the buildings
in our sample, we use typically applicable ﬁgures by construction year, reported
in Table 4.
4.2 Cost
Turning to the measurement of costs for each retroﬁt measure, we use a Geo-
graphic Information System (GIS) to calculate a cost-variable that draws on two
11Thermal bridges in the component are incorporated by adding 0.05 W per m2.
27Table 4: U-values and eﬃciency factors
Home Constructed Between
1975 1991 2002 Required
< 1975 -1990 -2001 -2005 Standard
U(Roof) 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
U(Fa¸ cade) 1.5 1 0.5 0.35 0.35
U(Window) 3.5 3.5 2 1.7 1.3
Eﬃciency Factor
for Heaters
1987 2002 Required
<1987 -2001 -2005 Standard
ep (Non-Electric) 1.19 1.11 1.05 1.05
ep (Electricity) 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
Note: U-values are measured in W/(m2*K). Source: Ecofys (2004), IWU (1997).
principle information sources. The ﬁrst of these is the BKI, or Construction-Cost
Information Center of German Architects, which publishes unit-cost ﬁgures for
various types of retroﬁt measures based on samples of retroﬁtted buildings (BKI
2006). Because these ﬁgures are national averages that aggregate material and
labor costs, we supplement this information with regional wage data for various
classes of craftsman obtained from a labor-survey conducted by the FDZ (2006).12
We normalize both average-unit cost and wage data so that they are measured
in prices of the year 2000. The ﬁnal step in calculating investment cost involves
constructing the ratio of local wages to the national average, which serves as a
regional weighting scheme to be multiplied by the average construction cost from
the BKI. This ﬁgure is in turn multiplied by an additional weight capturing the
12This survey contains average wages for various classes of craftsman, and, as with the house-
hold data, is measured at the scale of a municipality, of which there are approximately 13,490
in Germany. For a given craftsman class, there is an average of 200 municipalities from across
Germany for which wage data is available. To ensure overlapping coverage with the house-
hold data, we use GIS to spatially interpolate wages between the centroids of the represented
municipality using an inverse-distance weighted algorithm (Childs 2004). In this way, location-
speciﬁc wage information from the diﬀerent craftsman classes can be assigned to each household
location in the dataset.
28share of each craftsman’s labor required for a certain retroﬁt measure. The total
cost for one of the 16 retroﬁt combinations j is given as the sum among the
surface Ar of retroﬁtted components r from household i as follows:
(14) Cij =
 
r
 
 
c
ζc
local wageic
national aver. wagec
 
∗ average-unit costr ∗ Air,
with subscript c denoting the category of craftsman and ζc representing the share
of craftsman c’s labor in the retroﬁt.13 While households are denoted by the
subscript i, the term “local wageic” captures the wage of craftsman c in i’s mu-
nicipality.
13We checked our estimates of the average-unit cost against other published estimates (e.g.
Jakob (2006) or Finanztest (2007)) and found the ﬁgures to be commensurate.
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